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UTAH SUPREME COURT

450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

Western Water L.L.C. v. Jerry D. Olds, et al.
Appeal No. 20060527

Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
In reviewing the joint brief of 22 appellees in the above-referenced case, filed with
the Court on or about November 22, 2006,1 have notice an error which I wanted to bring to
your immediate attention.
In Section II of that brief, the parties in the court proceedings below are listed. The
22 appellees joining in the brief are designated by an asterisk following their respective
names. I represent appellee Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company which is listed in Section
II of the brief. However, through inadvertence, an asterisk was not placed after Utah and
Salt Lake Canal Company. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company has always intended to join
the brief and in speaking with lead counsel for appellees, the lack of an asterisk was
inadvertent. Therefore, I would request it be noted that appellee Utah and Salt Lake Canal
Company was intended to be included as a party to that brief and fully adopts and concurs
in the same.
If there are any problems with this or if you have any questions in this regard, please
do not hesitate to contact me. 1 thank you in advance for your consideration of this matter.
Very truly yours,
PARSONS B£HLE & LATIMER

Michael M. <Qu
MMQ/pct
cc:
All counsel of record
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I.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Appellees1 request oral argument because of the important issues on appeal.
H.

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW

Plaintiff/Appellant: Western Water, LLC.
Defendants/Appellees: Jerry D. Olds, State Engineer of the State of Utah; Alpine
City*; American Fork City*; W. Glade Berry; Bart D. Berry; Cahoon & Maxfield
Irrigation Company*; Cedar Fort Irrigation Company*; Central Utah Water Conservancy
District*; City of West Jordan; Morris Clark; Robert and Sherri Cook; George Crawford;
Rod Dansie; East Jordan Irrigation Company*; Geneva Steel LLC; Larry and Linda
Hadfield; Irvine Ranch & Petroleum Inc. dba Ambassador Duck Club*; Jordan Valley
Water Conservancy District*; Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation*; Lake Mountain
Mutual Water Company; Lehi City*; Lehi Spring Creek Irrigation Company*; Magna
Water Company*; Glenn R. Maughan; Susan Messersmith; Vernal Messersmith;
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy*; National Audubon Society; New
State Inc.; PacifiCorp*; Provo River Water Users Association*; Riverton City; Salt Lake
City Corporation*; Sandy City*; City of Saratoga Springs; Marvin Shepherd; Sierra
Club; South Jordan City; State of Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; State
of Utah Division of Parks and Recreation; State of Utah Division of Wildlife and
Recreation; State of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources; Paul Taylor; Edward Thomas;
Mary and Edward Thomas; Town of Cedar Fort*; Trout Unlimited; United States of

1

The 22 Appellees who join in this brief are identified by asterisk in Section II, and are
referred to herein as Appellees.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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America - Bureau of Reclamation; United States Fish & Wildlife Service; United States
Department of the Interior - Office of the Secretary; Utah Department of Transportation;
Utah Lake Distributing Company*; Utah Lake Landowners Inc.; Utah Reclamation
Mitigation & Conservation Commission; Utah Water Company L.L.C.; Utah Waters;
Utah Wetlands Foundation; Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company; Mack and Marie
Wagstaff; Shane and Michelle Wagstaff; E. Fred Walters; Dean and Leatrice Willes;
Clinger Family Partnership; John Jacob; Evan Johnson; Burnham Duck Club*; Lehi
Irrigation Company*; North Jordan Irrigation Company; South Jordan Canal Company;
Ron and Mindy Sager; Draper Irrigation Company; Lower Jordan Water Users
Association*; Marvin Shepherd; Utah Division of Water Rights; Does 1-50; Roe
Corporations 1-50; Moe Municipalities; and/or Governmental Entities 1-50.
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V.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellees agree with the assertion by Appellant ("Western") that this Court has

'

jurisdiction over this appeal under the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(f), as it is an
appeal from a final order of the district court sitting in review of an informal agency
action. Appellees disagree with Western's suggestion of jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(e)(v), as the adjudicative proceeding held by the State Engineer was not a
i

formal proceeding.
VI.
A.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction on the basis that Western's amended applications were not the subject
of a final order and had not otherwise been considered, and therefore were not properly
the subject of reconsideration.
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court reviews summary judgment for "correctness,
granting no deference to the [district] court's legal conclusions."

Wayment v. Clear

Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 11 15, 116 P.3d 271 (quotations and citation
omitted).

Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed for correctness.

Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, U 8, 31 P.3d 1147. The trial court's statutory
interpretation is also reviewed for correctness. State v. One Lot ofPers. Prop., 2004 UT
36, H 8, 90 P.3d 639 (quotations and citations omitted).
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B.

Did the trial court err in denying Western's motion for summary judgment

that no party other than the State Engineer should be allowed to present relevant,
admissible evidence on certain material issues?
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court reviews summary judgment for "correctness,
granting no deference to the [district] court's legal conclusions." Wayment, 2005 UT 25,
1115. The trial court's statutory interpretation is also reviewed for correctness. One Lot
ofPers. Prop., 2004 UT 36, H 8.
C.

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to award costs to Appellees where it

dismissed Western's administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: "The determination to award taxable costs is within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 460 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted). The scope of a district court's jurisdiction is a question of law and is therefore
reviewed for correctness. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, f 10, 137 P.3d 726.
VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Western quotes in full many constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to this
appeal. Accordingly, Appellees have not reproduced each of these provisions. For
purposes of this brief, the most salient provision is the following:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13
Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for
which review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section
63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute
final agency action, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific grounds upon
which relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the
request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency
and one copy shall be mailed to each party by the person making the
request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose,
shall issue a written order granting the request or denying the
request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the
request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to be
denied.
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The waters in the Utah Lake - Jordan River Basin (comprising much of Salt Lake
and Utah Counties) are fully appropriated. Indeed, the State Engineer has closed the
basin to new appropriations of surface and ground water. Nevertheless, individuals and
entities continue filing applications to appropriate water, hoping to remain in line under
Utah's "first in time, first in right" system of appropriation against the possibility that
water might become available for appropriation in the future.
Challenging the State Engineer's opinion that waters in the most populated basin
in this desert state were already fully appropriated, Western filed three applications to
appropriate water. Western asserts that its applications have priority for the water it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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seeks to appropriate over all other previously filed and pending applications to
appropriate because it contends this water has only newly become available for
appropriation due to the unadjudicated forfeiture of other water rights. Western wrongly
asserts that somehow its applications "leapfrog" ahead of the priorities of all other
pending applications.
In fact, no water has been adjudicated as forfeited in the basin, and even if there
were forfeited water in the system, it would by law first go to satisfy all other junior
water rights and pending applications. Western's applications are the most junior in the
basin.

Nevertheless, Western, through these applications, which it termed the

"Conservation Plan," sought authority to divert some 288,107 acre-feet of new water in
Salt Lake and Utah Counties and to convey, store and ultimately sell it to end-users for a
variety of so-called beneficial uses.
Under the Conservation Plan, Western proposed to appropriate and divert as much
water as it could find (all of which was already the subject of other water rights), from
diversion points located on land it did not own, pump it through wells and pipelines it
would later design and locate on lands to which it did not have title (or through existing
facilities owned by others in which Western had no rights), store it in unowned and
unpermitted surface and subsurface facilities, all in hopes of selling it to undetermined
users at a price and for uses and on locations to be determined somehow in the future.
Western did not (and does not) own rights to any of the land on which its proposed
facilities would be located nor, does it own any land on which the water could be put to
beneficial use; neither does it have any contracts in place for the purchase or use of any
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of the water it seeks to appropriate. The Conservation Plan, in short, is a bold attempt by
Western to speculate on Utah water rights.
Appellees (except for the State Engineer, who was named as a Defendant below
because of his administrative responsibilities) protested Western's applications because,
variously: they already own the water rights and sources Western proposed to utilize;
Western's proposed uses would impair or interfere with existing uses; Western's plans
are not feasible; Western lacks the financial ability to complete the massive project it
proposed; and because Western's applications and proposed uses are patently speculative.
This matter arises from Western's appeal of the State Engineer's denial of its
applications.
B«

Course of Proceedings

The State Engineer advertised Western's applications, received protests, and held
an informal administrative hearing. Following the hearing, the State Engineer entered a
Reissued Memorandum

Decision (the "Memorandum Decision") rejecting

the

Conservation Plan on all five statutory bases. Specifically, the State Engineer concluded
that Western had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that there was unappropriated
water in the sources it proposed to utilize, that its proposed use would not impair existing
rights or interfere with more beneficial uses, that its plan was physically and
economically feasible, that it had the financial ability to complete the project and that the
application was not filed for purposes of monopoly.

2

These are the statutory criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 and -8, all of
which must be satisfied for an application to be approved.
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Western then asked the State Engineer to reconsider his ruling under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-14 . In doing so, Western submitted the outline of what it called the
Revised Conservation Plan (the "Revised Plan" or, sometimes, the "amended
applications"), a radically altered version of the Conservation Plan. Details regarding the
Revised Plan were not then provided by Western, but it clearly would have impacted the
protesting parties in ways that were materially different from Western's original plan.
The State Engineer took no action on the Request for Reconsideration and, after 20 days,
the Request was deemed denied. Western then filed an action in Third District Court,
timely seeking review of the State Engineer's decision by trial de novo, in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.
C.

Disposition in the Lower Court.

After an extended period of inactivity, Western's appeal was assigned to Judge
Robert Hilder, who set it for trial. Though Western's Complaint read as if Western still
desired to pursue the original Conservation Plan, Western subsequently confirmed that it
intended only to challenge on appeal Western's claim that the State Engineer implicitly
rejected the Revised Plan when he declined to grant reconsideration.
Several motions were filed by the parties shortly before the trial date. In its
motions, Western sought to preclude from participating at all in the trial the
"environmental" protestants of Western's applications and those who had filed late
protests (but had been allowed by the State Engineer to participate at the informal
hearing). Western also sought an order limiting the issues on which other, admittedly
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interested, parties could be heard. Western was unsuccessful in these efforts and attempts
to include the denial of its motions in this appeal.
Appellees' pre-trial motions included a Motion for Summary Judgment primarily
based on the fact that Western had abandoned its appeal of the rejection of the
Conservation Plan and had not exhausted its administrative remedies with regard to the
Revised Plan. Therefore, there were no issues properly before the district court. In
particular, Appellees demonstrated that the Revised Plan had not been the subject of a
proper filing with the State Engineer, had not been advertised and was not addressed in
the informal hearing, and the State Engineer only looked at the Revised Plan to see if it
provided reason for him to reconsider his rejection of the Conservation Plan.

In

deposition testimony offered in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the State
Engineer confirmed that the Revised Plan was not before him when he issued his
Memorandum Decision and that he had never considered the merits of the Revised Plan.
Judge Hilder agreed with Appellees and found that Western had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies with regard to the Revised Plan. On that basis, he granted
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. He found that such failure deprived the court
of jurisdiction further to consider the merits of Western's appeal and awarded the
Appellees their costs as prevailing parties under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Western
appeals these rulings.
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IX.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Western filed three applications to appropriate with the Utah State Engineer, the
first two on March 5, 1999 and a third on May 23, 2001. (R. 2133 f 1; R. 3189 f 1; R. 45, H 12-13.) The State Engineer advertised the applications, drawing many protests. (R.
2133 f 3; R. 3189 f 2.) Western presented a lengthy, detailed Statement of Facts in
support of its applications, which was distributed to the State Engineer and the
protestants.

(R. 2133 f 4; R. 3189 <J[ 2; R. 5 f 15.)3 The proposal on which the

applications were based was called by Western its "Conservation Plan." (R. 2133 f 4; R.
3189 f 2; R 2189 at 2nd %) The Conservation Plan is defined in the Statement of Facts.
(R.2194.)
The State Engineer held an informal hearing on the three applications and the
associated Conservation Plan in November 2002. That hearing was recorded and a
transcript prepared. (R. 2267-2655; R. 2133 f 6; R. 3189 f 2.) A month later, before a
decision had been issued, Western advised the State Engineer by letter that a "much
smaller project is feasible" and that Western was "entitled to as much water as can be
appropriated under its applications .. .." (R. 3189; R. 3203.)
The State Engineer denied the applications, explaining his reasons in a
Memorandum Decision. (R. 2133 f 7; R. 3189 1 2; R. 2199-2215.) Western timely

3

The Statement of Facts presented in support of the applications consists of 86 pages of
narrative discussion concerning Western's "Conservation Plan." (R. 52 at 2nd %) It
also includes another 254 pages of exhibits. Because of that bulk, only relevant
excerpts from the Statement of Facts were included below, including the Executive
Summary, the Introduction, the Definitions and the "Brief Statement of the Facts."
(R. 2133, n.l;R. 2189-2198.)
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requested reconsideration under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13, which included a request
that the State Engineer approve a substantially reduced or scaled back plan that amended
the three applications to appropriate. (R. 2233; R. 5 f 18; R. 2133-34 f 18; R. 3189 f 2.)
The amendments contained in the Revised Plan deleted points of diversion,
facilities and other features "not needed for the function of the core portion and function
of the plan." (R. 3190.) The amendments also changed the purpose of the proposed
water use, from mostly municipal to mostly agricultural. (R. 2185-86, 2187.) Other
changes were also proposed. (R. 2198, 2171, 2187-88, 2165.) Western explained on
reconsideration that its amended applications were designed to respond to the denial of
the original Conservation Plan:
After consideration of the concerns of the State Engineer and the
protestants, Western Water has modified its Conservation Plan to
meet those concerns. The State Engineer is requested to reconsider
the applications under the revised and reduced plan attached hereto.
(R.2220.)
The State Engineer reviewed the reconsideration request to determine whether he
had erred or otherwise needed to revise his decision, concluding that he did not. (R.
3028.) He was "conscious" that the Revised Plan was a scaled-down version of the
Conservation Plan. (R. 3028.) He took no further action, meaning that the request was
considered to be denied pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b). (R. 2133 f 10;
R. 3189-3190f4; R. 6 120.)
The Revised Plan is neither mentioned nor described in the Statement of Facts and
is not included in the "Definitions" portion of the Statement of Facts presented in support
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of the applications. (R. 2134 f 11; R. 3190 f 5; R. 2189-98.) Neither is it mentioned in
the Memorandum Decision.

(R. 2199-2214.)

It is not mentioned in the hearing

transcript. (R. 2267-2655; R. 2134 f 11; R. 3190 f 5.) It is not mentioned in Western's
letter to the State Engineer. (R. 3189.)
Western filed this action seeking approval of the Revised Plan. (R. 6 ff 25, 26; R.
7 f 28.) Consistent with those claims, Western confirmed "that the trial [of this action]
will be based on [Western's] Applications as amended by the Revised Conservation
Plan." (R. 2233 [emphasis in original]; see also R. 2161,11. 5-8.)
Western conceded during discovery, however, that its applications as amended by
the Revised Plan were not presented to the State Engineer at or before the informal
hearing.

(R. 2162.)

The Memorandum Decision does not address the amended

applications. (R. 2183-84.) The State Engineer has not issued a decision on the Revised
Plan. (R. 2184.) Rather, it was undisputed that the applications as amended by the
Revised Plan were submitted after the Memorandum Decision was issued, as part of
Western's Request for Reconsideration. (R. 2134 f 9; R. 3189 f 3; R. 5 f 18; R. 7 f 26;
R. 2183-84; R. 2162.)
X.
A.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Western filed its action in the district court seeking de novo review of the

rejection of its three applications to appropriate water. The State Engineer had reviewed,
advertised, conducted a hearing, and issued an opinion with regard to Western's
Conservation Plan.

Western requested reconsideration and, in connection with that
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request, submitted a summary of what it termed the Revised Plan, a proposal that was
dramatically different from the Conservation Plan, both in its scope and its potential
impacts on the rights of others. The Revised Plan was never the subject of formal
application, was never advertised, was not addressed at the hearing, and was not ruled on
by the State Engineer. Indeed, the State Engineer confirmed that he had taken no action
with regard to the Revised Plan other than to consider whether it gave him a basis to
reconsider his decision rejecting the Conservation Plan.
In the district court action, Western abandoned all claims relating to the
Conservation Plan and elected to pursue only claims relating to the State Engineer's
treatment of the Revised Plan. The trial court properly found that Western had not
exhausted its administrative remedies in that regard and accordingly dismissed Western's
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In particular, the trial court found that Western had
failed to follow the procedures required to obtain review of the Revised Plan and that it
was not sufficient for Western to raise the plan for the first time in connection with a
request for reconsideration of its prior, rejected plan.
The court's determination that Western failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies with regard to the Revised Plan, and the State Engineer's testimony that he had
in fact not acted upon that plan, amply support the trial court's conclusion that it was
without jurisdiction to address the merits of Western's appeal.
B.

Prior to entry of summary judgment dismissing Western's Complaint for

lack of jurisdiction, Western filed motions asking the court to limit the involvement of
the various parties in the de novo trial. In particular, Western sought a declaration that
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only the State Engineer would be entitled to present evidence on certain trial issues,
including Western's statutory burden of demonstrating the feasibility of its plan, its
financial ability, and that its application was not filed for purposes of a monopoly. Even
though numerous parties had objected to the Conservation Plan, and had submitted
evidence and argument to the State Engineer on these very points, Western asked the trial
court anticipatorily to bar their participation at trial because they were not "appropriate
parties" to comment on matters of public interest. Western ignores the fact that each of
these protesting parties is entitled to be heard on all of the ways Western's applications
would affect them and to hold Western to its statutory burdens. Western also ignores the
fact that the parties Western tried to bar from participation on these "public" issues
include all of the major public water agencies that operate publicly funded systems and
provide public water supplies in the very areas Western proposed to serve.
The protesting parties submitted evidence to the State Engineer relating to all five
criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8. It was their obligation to do so in order to
preserve such issues for appeal. Having preserved those issues, the protesting parties are
clearly "interested persons" entitled to present at trial evidence and argument on the
impact of Western's proposals, including those aspects which relate to the public interest.
The trial court correctly rejected Western's argument.
C.

Even though the trial court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to address

the merits of the case because of Western's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies,
the court retained jurisdiction to award costs to the prevailing parties under Utah R. Civ.
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P. 54(d). The nature and amount of the costs incurred by the parties were not challenged
by Western. The award of these costs should be affirmed.
XL
A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction After Western
Failed To Exhaust Its Administrative Remedies Concerning Its
Amended Applications.
1.

The trial court could not proceed without subject matter jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction is "the authority and competency of the court to decide
the case." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994), quoting Department
of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). That power, or its limit, is
strictly observed and is subject neither to waiver nor stipulation. Id. "[Wjhen subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill
that void." Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Utah App. 1991); see also Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If U 34-36, 100 P.3d 1177.
A court must dismiss an action it lacks the power to hear. Clark v. Hansen, 631
P.2d 914 (Utah 1981) (affirming dismissal on subject matter jurisdiction grounds because
matter still pending before State Engineer); Utah Sign, Inc. v. Dept. ofTransp., 896 P.2d
632 (Utah 1995) (affirming dismissal on subject matter jurisdiction grounds for failure to
comply with Utah's Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA")).
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2.

A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before invoking
district court subject matter jurisdiction to review a State Engineer
decision.

The district court has subject matter jurisdiction "to review by trial de novo all
final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). A proceeding before the State Engineer is informal. Utah Admin.
Code § R655-2-8.8. A party "aggrieved" by a State Engineer decision "may obtain
judicial review" by complying with UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b, et seq. See Utah
Code Ann. §73-3-14.
Jurisdiction may be invoked, however, "only after" the plaintiff exhausts "all
administrative remedies available." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2); see also Nebeker v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n., 2001 UT 74, U 14, 34 P.3d 180 ("parties must exhaust
applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review"). Unless
this condition is satisfied, "courts lack subject matter jurisdiction." Housing Authority v.
Snyder, 2002 UT 38, H 11, 44 P.3d 724.
3.

The State Engineer must advertise and consider an application and
any protests.

The State Engineer is "entrusted [with] the responsibility of sorting out competing
claims to Utah's scarce water resources."

United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-

Cleveland Irr. Co., 2003 UT 49, H 14, 79 P.3d 945. To accomplish this sweeping task,
the statutes governing appropriation contemplate broad, public participation:
A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures that those
who have an interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant
facts and considerations at the time the agency makes its decision.
Moreover, the requirement of [participation] gives the agency and
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the other participants notice of the identity and concern of interested
parties."
S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted).
Upon receiving an application, the State Engineer publishes notice describing the
application. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6.4 At that early stage, the State Engineer may
correct, "before or after" publication, non-prejudicial "[clerical errors, ambiguities, and
mistakes . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6(1 )(c). After publication, however, substantive
changes, specifically "amendments or corrections" involving "a change of point of
diversion, place, or purpose of use of water" require that notice be republished. Utah
Code Ann. § 73-3-6(2); see also Whitmore v. Welch, 201 P.2d 954, 959 (Utah 1949)
(substantially similar version of 73-3-6 "require[d] republication where amendments
involve a change of point of diversion, place, or purpose of use of water").
Following publication, "interested" parties may protest. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7.
The State Engineer then evaluates the application, applying the several factors listed in
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8. See Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 16, H 23, 133
P.3d 382. All of these procedures were followed in connection with Western's original
applications resulting in the Memorandum Decision. (R. 2199-2214.)
4.

Western failed to preserve a claim on the Revised Plan.

To preserve a claim on its Revised Plan, Western was required to "raise [that]
issue before [the State Engineer] to preserve the issue for further review." Badger v.
4

Various sections of the appropriation statutes have been amended as recently as 2003,
including Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6. Where required, therefore, the version in effect
at the time Western filed its first applications—March, 1999 (R. 4, f][ 11-12)—are
cited.
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Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) ("Badger IF) (affirming summary
judgment against certain plaintiffs who had failed to raise water right claims before State
Engineer). A complaining party may not "by-pass" the State Engineer "by refusing or
neglecting" to submit an issue "and then call upon the courts to determine [such] matters"
for the first time. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996) ("Badger
/").

Preserving an issue in an informal proceeding is not particularly difficult. Western
must meet only a "level of consciousness" test by bringing the issue "to the fact finder's
attention so that there is at least the possibility that it could be considered." Badger II,
966 P.2d at 847; see also BAM Development v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, H 48,
87P.3d710. 5
Western's principal conceded that its Revised Plan was not presented until after
agency action on the original applications:
Q.
The reissued memorandum decision does not concern the
revised conservation plan . . . is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.
The revised conservation plan only came up on your request
for reconsideration.
A.

Yes.

The "level of consciousness" standard is "less exacting" than is applied at trial to
preserve an issue for appeal. To preserve a trial issue, "(1) the issue must be raised in
a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) [the] party must
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger II, 966 P.2d at 847
(citation and internal quote marks omitted).
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Q.
To your knowledge, has the State engineer issued a
memorandum decision on the revised conservation plan?
A.

They've not.

(Depo. of Ronald Christensen, R. 2183-84.) The State Engineer concurred. (R. 3028.)
5.

Western misunderstands reconsideration because it misapplies Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-13.

The next step in the application process is based on the statutory premise that the
State Engineer has issued a final decision within the meaning of UAPA. That is, a party
aggrieved by the decision may choose between a request for reconsideration of that
decision, or a de novo appeal in the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13; see
also Harper Invs., Inc. v. Auditing Div., 868 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1994) ("The Code
allows a petitioner to seek reconsideration of an agency decision within twenty days or to
seek immediate judicial review within thirty days of a final decision and forego any
further agency action.")
This Court has explained repeatedly that a statute's plain language is the first
authority in determining its meaning. See, e.g., Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT
102, H 18, 104 P.3d 1242. Presumed to have been used "advisedly," the words are
applied according to their "ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d
479, 481 (Utah 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Contradictory or unworkable
interpretations are rejected. Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, U 21, 70 P.3d 78. In short,
a court's task is "to implement the law as it reads unless it results in an absurd outcome."
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1997); see also Perrine v.
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (the plain language rule
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applies "unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of the statute.").
a.

Reconsideration permits a review of only a final decision.

Western's entire argument rests on a misapplication of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b13 of UAPA ("-13"). That section (quoted in full above) provides that an agency may
reconsider a given decision. If the order in question is unreviewable by either the agency
that issued it or a "superior agency," "and if the order would otherwise constitute final
agency action" a party may seek "reconsideration." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a)
(emphasis added). That request must "state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested." Id.
The agency may expressly grant or deny the request in writing. See Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(a). If it does not act either way within 20 days, however, "the
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b13(2)(b). In other words, the agency is not required to act at all; it may elect to deny the
request simply by waiting 20 days.
Western's appeal is based on a fundamentally incorrect reading of -13. Western
argues that the request for reconsideration keeps the administrative process "alive,"
preventing "a 'final administrative action.'" (App. Brf. at 26.) Accordingly, argues
Western, because the State Engineer was aware that the Revised Plan was submitted with
the reconsideration request (R. 3027-28), denial of that request constituted denial—and
therefore final agency action on—the Revised Plan. (App. Brf. at 26-27.)
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i

b.

Reconsideration means what it says, and the State Engineer correctly
addressed Western's request.

"Reconsider" means to "consider again, especially] for a possible change of
decision." Oxford American Dictionary, 667 (1999). It means to reexamine an existing
{

th

decision or result. See Black's Law Dictionary at 1272 (6 ed. 1990). Its synonyms
include "reappraise, revaluate," "rethink," "review," "go back over," or "take a second
look." Roget's Thesaurus, 485.26 (4th ed. 1977). Plainly, then, reconsideration means
only that the agency may "rethink" a "previous decision." It just as plainly does not
mean or contemplate a new, revised, modified or even—using Western's term—"reduced
[or "smaller"] project plan." (App. Brf. at 19, 21.)
This is precisely how the State Engineer addressed Western's request.

He

explained in his deposition how he treats reconsideration requests:
Q. And I believe you testified earlier that when you receive a
Request for Reconsideration what you look for is in the information
given to you is there any reason for you to go back and revisit your
original decision?
A.

Yes. Did we miss something? Did we make an error?

Q. Okay. Did the information in the Revised Conservation Plan
and the Request for Reconsideration, so far as you recall them, give
you reason to reconsider your decision on the original Conservation
Plan?
A.

No.

(R. 3028.)
The State Engineer's treatment of Western's request was consistent with the plain
meaning of the term "reconsideration."

The trial court applied -13 the same way,
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observing that "the Revised Plan submitted with [Western's] Request for Reconsideration
was reviewed only to determine whether it gave reason to reconsider . . . ." (R. 2292.)
That interpretation was also consistent with prior judicial gloss on the meaning of
reconsideration. "Under UAPA, a request for reconsideration asks the highest level of
administrative decision maker to reassess a claim they have previously examined."
Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n., 860 P.2d 944, 951 n. 11 (Utah App.
1993);6 see also Career Serv. Rev. Bd. v. Dept. of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 945 (Utah
1997) ("Until an appeal was perfected, the Board retained jurisdiction and had the
inherent authority to reconsider and modify its . . . Order in light of subsequently
discovered facts."). The State Engineer had not "previously examined" the Revised Plan.
c.

Because finality is a prerequisite to reconsideration under -13,
Western could not expect action on its Revised Plan.

Despite Western's determination to read more into "reconsideration" than its
common meaning suggests is even possible, the rest of -13 demonstrates Western's error.
The only way reconsideration can mean that an amended proposal is appropriate at that
stage is if the agency has not already produced a final order. If there is more remaining
for the agency to do, in other words, then perhaps it may consider an amended version of
what it is already considering.

"A request for review, on the other hand, asks a higher level decision maker to
evaluate the claim. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989) (agency review
procedures) Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (requests for reconsideration)." Maverik,
860P.2dat951,n.ll.
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But -13 permits "reconsideration" only "if the order would otherwise constitute
final agency action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a). There must be a final order to
reappraise. This court has already read -13 to mean that it "allows a party to file a
request for reconsideration from a final agency action within twenty days of the final
action's issuance." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Tax Comm'n., 2000 UT 40, If 11 n.4, 999 P.2d
17 (emphasis added). Finality thus deprives a party of any right to agency action on an
amended proposal.
Accordingly, a party may not amend a proposal already acted on in a final order.
Further, reconsideration is not an invitation to respond to the final decision by amending

\

an application that has already been denied. The district court applied the meaning of
reconsideration correctly, ruling that Western's failure to present the Revised Plan "for
i

consideration" before final decision on the original plan prevented final agency action on
the Revised Plan. (R. 3292.)
If any doubt remains, the fact that reconsideration is optional demonstrates that it

i

does not contemplate further or additional agency action beyond a second look at a
"final" decision. That is, because it is optional, reconsideration is not required before
seeking judicial review, is not an extension of the agency's consideration process, and
thus is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. See Harper Invs., 868 P.2d at
i

815 (a petitioner may either seek reconsideration of a final decision or "immediate
judicial review .. . and fore go any further agency action.") (emphasis added).
Western contends that denial of reconsideration (in this case by allowing the 20

^

days to pass without action) was tantamount to agency consideration and denial of the
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A

amended applications, because that plan was submitted with the reconsideration request.
(App. Brf. at 24-25.) As support, Western relies on its statement to the State Engineer
that "a smaller project is feasible."

(R. 3203; App. Brf. at 19), and argues that the

Revised Plan is "an exact subset of the original Conservation Plan." (App. Brf. at 32.)
This is the structure of Western's argument that reconsideration kept the
administrative process "alive" or "open." This, in Western's view, amounted to active
consideration of the Revised Plan (beyond reconsideration of the original proposal)
simply because the State Engineer was aware that the applications had been amended.
(R. 3027-28.)
The argument is infected with the fallacy of division—that what is true of the
whole must also be true of its component parts. See, e.g., U.S. v. Standefer, 610 F.2d
1076, 1106 (3 Cir. 1979). Even assuming that the Revised Plan were merely a smaller
version of the original proposal, State Engineer review and denial of the Conservation
Plan does not also mean review and denial of every potential smaller, altered or amended
permutation of that plan.
Western argues that "there can be no final agency action when a Request for
Reconsideration is filed because a judicial review is barred." (App. Brf. at 26.) This
much is true, almost, but not in the way Western intends. A reconsideration request does
not render the order in question any less final. On the contrary, finality is its prerequisite.
The request merely delays the time when the aggrieved party must seek judicial review.
See, e.g., Harper Inv., 868 P.2d at 816; Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) ("A party
shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the date
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been
{

issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).").
In other words, Western's request for reconsideration stayed appealablity for at
least the amount of time it took for the request to be denied, but not finality. Only after
the time for reconsideration ran and the request was considered denied under -13 could
Western appeal to the district court. But the final decision had not changed. Western
was limited to an appeal of the only final decision made to date—the Memorandum
Decision, (R. 2199-2215), which considered only the original Conservation Plan, not its
unadvertised, unconsidered, unprotested and undecided amendments. (R. 3028; App.

i

Brf.at25;R.3292.)
6.

Western conceded that the State Engineer did not consider the
Revised Plan.

<

District court subject matter jurisdiction is based on a final decision. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-56b-14.

Western's Revised Plan was by its own admission an

amendment to the three denied applications. (See R. 6 f 19; R. 2233.) The Complaint is
based on those amendments (R. 6 f 25; R. 7 f][ 28, 1), and Western confirmed "that the
trial [of this action] will be based on [Western's] Applications as amended by the Revised
Conservation Plan." (R. 2233) [emphasis in original].)
Western concedes that this claim—the only claim pursued by Western—was not

.

presented to the State Engineer at or before the hearing:
Q.
And is it your feeling that the original proposal was, in fact,
amended by the revised conservation plan?
A.

<

Yes.
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A

Q.

You attended the hearing-the State engineer hearing.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You took a major role in that, in the presentation.

A.

Yes.

Q.
Were the applications as amended by the revised conservation
plan submitted to the State engineer at or before the hearing that you
attended?
A.

The applications?

Q.

As amended by the revised conservation plan.

A.

Before the hearing?

Q.

At or before the hearing.

A.

No.

(Depo. of Ron Christensen, R. 2162; R. 2138.)
The Revised Plan is neither mentioned nor described in the Statement of Facts
presented to the State Engineer to support the applications. (R. 2189-92, 2193, 2194,
2195-98.) Neither was it mentioned or described at the informal hearing. (R. 22672655.)

It is not mentioned in the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision. (R. 2199-

2215.)

Neither is it included in Western's letter to the State Engineer sent before

issuance of the Memorandum Decision.

(R. 3189; R. 3203.)

The State Engineer

considered the applications only as they related to the original Conservation Plan. (R.
2199-2215; R. 3027-29.)
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Accordingly, the claim Western used to invoke subject matter jurisdiction—its
"amended" applications—was never considered by the State Engineer. (R. 3027-28.)
The many protestants—approximately 75 in all—never had an "opportunity to consider
or offer evidence regarding the impacts of the Revised Plan . . . ." (R. 3292.) Therefore,
as the district court concluded, there has been no "final agency action" on that claim
capable of conferring subject matter jurisdiction on that court. (R. 3292.) See Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-14(l).
7.

The State Engineer could not have considered the Revised Plan
without republished notice and a new administrative process.

Even if Western is extended the benefit of any doubt and we assume that the State
Engineer could have considered the amended applications on reconsideration, he could
not have acted without first publishing notice. Recall that when an application is filed,
the State Engineer may sua sponte correct non-prejudicial "[clerical errors, ambiguities,
and mistakes

" Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6(l)(c).

Should any "amendments or corrections" involve changes in diversion points or
the "place or purpose" of water use, however, the State Engineer must republish the
amended application. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6(2). Accordingly, because the Revised
Plan—which Western conceded "amended" its original applications (R. 2233)—called
for different diversion points and a change in the purpose for the water (R. 2185-86,
2187, 2198, 2171, 2187-88, 2165), republished notice was required before the State
Engineer could act. The State Engineer testified:
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Q.
Now, you were asked a couple of questions earlier about
whether you have the authority to approve less than the total amount
of water requested in an application; do you remember that?
A.

Yes.

Q.
I think you used the words you—you—you could have
approved an application for a down-sized application.
A.

Yes.

Q.
Now, if on—on a reconsideration the request is not just for
down-sized in terms of the amount of water, say, from ten secondfeet to five second-feet, but there's an attempt to revise the
application and scope, the location of diversions, the nature of
diversion facilities, perhaps the nature of the storage mechanism, is—
is that the type of down-sizing or limiting of an application that you
would handle administratively after a hearing?
A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.
Again, the elements of if you want to call it the application
have changed, and if those type of changes are made then there
would need to be public notice and, again, the process started on the
modified application, if you want to call it that.
Q.
In other words, i[f] those types of features which are
necessary attributes of water rights are changed you would want to
readvertise that so that people were on notice of it and had an
opportunity to be heard?
A.

Yes.

(R. 3027.)
The trial court concurred in the State Engineer's implicit interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 73-3-6. He testified that amendments as substantive as these require notice.
The district court concurred, ruling that there had been no notice, no opportunity for
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protest, no hearing and no agency action at all on the Revised Plan, which the trial court
determined was a "significant reformulation" of the original proposal. (R. 3292.)
Moreover, Western downplays the nature of the amendments contained in the
Revised Plan.

They did more than merely delete diversion points.

According to

Western, "[t]he heart of the Conservation Plan [was] the Cedar Valley Storage and
Recovery System."

(R. 2198.)

This "system" was to include "recharge basins or

injection wells" to store water underground. Id. Under the Revised Plan, injection wells
were no longer planned, and there may not be any recharge basins. (R. 2171, 2187-88.)
The original applications called for a "municipal quality supply pipeline." (R.
2190.) Under the Revised Plan, none of the original diversions are for domestic or
municipal use. (R. 2185-86.) The primary use will be irrigation.

(R. 2187.) The

Revised Plan abandoned significant diversion, transport and use facilities in the Salt Lake
Valley. (R. 2164; R. 2227.) Storage in Utah Lake—plainly a "purpose and nature of
use" of water—was also deleted.

(R. 2228.)

To be acted on, these substantive

amendments changing the place and purpose of use required republished notice. See
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6(2).
Furthermore, the State Engineer was constrained by his own rule concerning
reconsideration. If he grants reconsideration, and under -13 he needs a final decision to
do it, he "may affirm his former decision or may abrogate it, or may change or modify
the same in any particular." Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-17(D). Neither this rule nor
-13 contemplate agency review of amendments to an application that is already denied
pursuant to a final decision.
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8.

The act of denying reconsideration under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b13 is not itself a reviewable agency action.

Union Pacific contains this Court's three-part test to determine agency finality.
The first element is whether judicial review will "disrupt the orderly process of
[administrative] adjudication." The second is whether the administrative decision created
rights, obligations or "legal consequences." The third asks whether the agency decision
"in whole or in part" is merely "preliminary" or otherwise a precursor to further agency
action. Union Pac, 2004 UT 40, U 16.
As a preliminary matter, no one disputes that the Memorandum Decision was
final. (R. 2195-2215; R. 5, f 17.) Western theorizes that the State Engineer's inaction on
the request for reconsideration is somehow a secondary or additional final agency action
such that Western's claims on the amended applications are preserved. (R. 6 f 25; R. 7 f
28.)
Western's theory cannot get past Union Pacific.

First, judicial review would

disrupt the administrative process because it is undisputed that the Revised Plan has not
been advertised, protested, or considered. There was no agency action whatsoever. (R.
3027-28.) Specifically, the State Engineer testified:

(R. 3028.)

Q.

"[H]as the State Engineer's office ever acted on the Revised
...Plan?

A.

No.

Western concedes this critical point: "The parties agreed that the State

Engineer did not take any action on the Request [for Reconsideration]; he did not
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advertise the [Revised Plan], entertain any protests on it nor did he conduct a hearing on
it." (App. Brf. at 25; 7 see also R. 3373 at 51.)
The second prong of Union Pacific also barred district court action on the Revised
Plan; action on reconsideration was limited to determining whether the Memorandum
Decision was in error. (R. 3028.) The State Engineer's inaction did not, because it could
not, create any rights, obligations or even "legal consequences" beyond the right to
appeal the final decision.
Nothing is triggered by inaction on any request under -13 except for the right to de
novo review of the already final order in question. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

<

14(3)(a) ("A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
i

considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)").

7

Union Pacific's

Western cites Brady v. McGonagle, 195 P. 188 (Utah 1921), as support for the theory
that "inaction" on the reconsideration request "is a final agency action, in and of itself,
reviewable by the Court."
(App. Brf. at 27.) Brady says nothing about
reconsideration. Undeterred, however, Western cures that problem by inserting its
preferred language, in brackets, into a quote from page 191 of that opinion, utterly
changing the meaning of the quoted text, attempting to manufacture authority for a
proposition that has none.
Western attempts a somewhat less egregious misuse of authority when it cites Vigos v.
Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207, for the proposition that "this
court promoted a liberal policy toward an applicant to request and make changes after
an administrative decision." (App. Brf. at 34.) Vigos was a workers compensation
case in which this Court recognized the Industrial Commission's "continuing
jurisdiction" over a claim based on Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 ("The powers and
jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The commission,
after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former findings
and orders.")
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<

i

*

third prong does not apply because the only "decision" on reconsideration was to deny it.
(R. 3028.) The amended applications were not considered, then or at any other time.
Were the Court to road-test Western's theory, we can surmise the result based on
experience with the long questioned and recently outlawed motion for reconsideration.
See Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 11 8, 135 P.3d 861.

If, as Western proposes,

reconsideration under -13 means something more than a second look at a final decision,
and is instead an invitation to amend a denied proposal, finality itself is at risk.
What is to prevent re-reconsideration based on yet another permutation of a denied
proposal? See, e.g., Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah
1991), quoting Drury v. Lanceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). Under Western's theory,
the "indefatigable die-hard" could keep the administrative process "alive" indefinitely,
seeking either attrition or surrender while honing its proposal, clogging the State
Engineer's office, consuming resources and delaying indefinitely district court review
and a final judgment. Western's theory defies more than just the logical and accepted
meaning of "reconsideration." It also defies the sound rule that a party gets only one shot
at administrative reconsideration. See Maverik Country Stores, 860 P.2d at 951 & nn. 911.
B.

All Parties Are Entitled To Present Relevant, Admissible Evidence On
All Material Issues.

In its Issue No. 5, Western argues that certain parties before the district court were
"appropriate parties" only as to some of the issues, and were therefore not entitled to
present evidence on all of the issues before the trial court. Specifically, Western claims
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that only the State Engineer is entitled to offer certain categories of evidence in the de
novo proceeding. The district court correctly denied Western's motion and held that all
parties may introduce evidence to the extent it is relevant, admissible, and not
cumulative.8 (Transcript of Motion Hearing, April 10, 2006, at 44, R. 3372.)
1.

Substantive Water Law Requires the Full-Fledged Participation of
All Defendants in a De Novo Review of the State Engineer's
Decision.

Before approving an application to appropriate water, the State Engineer
advertises the application. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6. Any interested person may
then file a protest with the State Engineer. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(1). The State
Engineer is required to "consider the protests and shall approve or reject the application."
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(2).
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 contains the criteria to be considered in approving or
rejecting an application to appropriate water.9 In relevant part, that section provides:
(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve an application
if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the proposed source; (b) the
proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the
more beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed plan is physically
and economically feasible, ... and would not prove detrimental to
the public welfare; (d) the applicant has the financial ability to
complete the proposed works; and (e) the application was filed in
good faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly. If the
state engineer, because of information in his possession obtained
either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to
No evidence was presented because no de novo proceeding was held.
9

This statute applies whether the application is being reviewed by the State Engineer
(in an administrative proceeding) or by a trial court (on de novo review of the State
Engineer's decision). See Shields v. Dry CreekIrrig. Co., 363 P.2d 82, 84 (Utah
1961); Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983).
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believe.. .an application to appropriate water will interfere with its
more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock
watering, power or mining development or manufacturing, or will
unreasonable affect public recreation or the natural stream
environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it is his
duty to withhold his approval or rejection.. .until he has investigated
the matter. If an application does not meet the requirements of this
section, it shall be rejected.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8.
A person aggrieved by an order from the State Engineer may obtain review in the
district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14. As a district court re-examines the State
Engineer's decision, it does not act as an appellate body, but conducts a de novo review
"by holding a new trial." Archer v. Board of State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142,
1144 (Utah 1995). A district court owes no formal deference to the state agency. Id.
"[T]he applicant must proceed under and be governed by the same statutory provisions as
would have been applicable had his application been approved by the state engineer."
Eardley v. Terry, 11 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1938). In addition, an applicant must raise
issues in the administrative proceeding in order to preserve them for review by the district
court. This Court has noted:
[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before
that agency to preserve the issue for further review. It is well settled
that "persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies
'may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine . . .
matters properly determinable originally by such agencies.'"
Badger II, 966 P.2d at 847 (citations omitted).
Western's assertion that Appellees who appeared and participated as protestants in
the proceeding before the State Engineer should not be allowed to participate fully or
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present evidence in the de novo review not only flies in the face of Utah Code Ann. § 733-7 (any "person interested" may appear as a protestant), it conflicts with this Court's
logic in Badger II. In Badger II, the Court was concerned that a petitioner in a de novo
review could circumvent the administrative process by failing to submit issues of fact
during the administrative hearing, only to assert them for the first time during the district
court's de novo review. This case presents the opposite side of the same coin: Western
here seeks to circumvent the administrative process, not by presenting new issues of fact
but by attempting to exclude issues and evidence properly presented at the administrative
hearing and which should be considered by the district court on a de novo review. The
district court's understanding of the issues and development of facts requires all parties'
full participation. The district court correctly held that the various parties who had to be
joined were entitled to fully participate on each of the issues.
2.

There is No Standing Requirement to Be a Respondent/Defendant.

Standing in a de novo review is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied
by a petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to review a decision of the State
Engineer. Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, H 6 n.
2, 82 P.3d 1125. However, the concept of "standing" has no bearing on the question of
what parties must be joined or what evidence the court may consider, once a respondent
is joined in the case.
When an "aggrieved" party files a petition for de novo review of an informal State
Engineer decision, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(b) of UAPA requires: "The petition
shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents . . . ." (Emphasis
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added.) There is thus a difference between the standard for determining who is entitled to
seek de novo review of a State Engineer's decision and the standard for determining who
must be joined when a Petitioner seeks such review. To have standing to initiate an
appeal, the petitioner must be an "aggrieved" person. However, the petitioner is not
required merely to name other "aggrieved" persons as respondents, but must name the
agency and "all other appropriate parties." The distinction is not, as Western asserts,
between "appropriate" parties and "interested" parties, but between "aggrieved" parties
(i.e., persons who have standing to initiate an appeal as plaintiff), and "appropriate"
parties (i.e., persons who have a right to participate once an appeal has been properly
initiated). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(2)(a) gives direction as to who at least some of
those "appropriate" parties are by requiring the petitioner to identify all persons who
were parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action.
3.

Western Misapprehends this Court's Holding in Washington County.

Western relies on Washington County; however, its reliance is misplaced.

In

Washington County, this Court considered whether an ostensible appeal of a decision
approving an application to change the point of diversion and place and nature of use of
an existing water right under Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 could be used to assert forfeiture
of the underlying water rights under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4. This Court held that the
plaintiff did not have standing to initiate an independent action for forfeiture under Utah
Code Ann. § 73-1-4, and that the plaintiff could not, therefore, use a purported de novo
review of a decision approving a change application to assert forfeiture of the underlying
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water rights. The issue of who might be "appropriate" respondents in a de novo review
of a decision of the State Engineer was not even raised.
The Court framed the "standing" issue as follows:
This argument raises the question of whether every "interested"
person who protests a change application is also an "aggrieved"
person entitled to judicial review of the state engineer's decision on
that application.
Id. at H 11. It was in this context—a determination of whether the plaintiff in
Washington County had standing to use an appeal of the State Engineer's decision as a
vehicle to assert forfeiture under a separate chapter of Title 73—that the Court stated:
Were we to interpret the phrase "any person aggrieved" to include
all interested persons who protest a change application, the filing of
a change application would expose the underlying water rights to
otherwise unavailable forfeiture challenges, because an uninjured
protestant would be able to insert its foot into an otherwise closed
jurisdictional door.
Id. at U 16 (emphasis added).
In its brief, Western significantly changes the court's language by deleting certain
words and substituting other words in brackets as follows:
Were we to interpret the phrase ["appropriate party"] to include all
interested persons who protest a[n] . . . application, the filing of [the]
. . . application would expose the [application] to otherwise
unavailable . . . challenges, because an uninjured protestant would be
able to insert its foot into an otherwise closed jurisdictional door. Id.
at 1130.
(App.Brf.at42.)
The issue the Court addressed in the quoted passage in Washington County was
not "who is an 'appropriate party' defendant in an appeal under the Utah Code Ann. § 63Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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46b-14 of the UAPA," but rather whether a plaintiff, merely by protesting a change
application on an otherwise valid water right, has standing to bring an independent claim
of forfeiture against the underlying water right. By changing "any aggrieved person" to
"appropriate party," "a change application" to "an application," "underlying water rights"
to "application," and "unavailable forfeiture challenges" to "unavailable challenges,"
Western significantly changes the Court's holding, and implies that the Court was
addressing issues completely different from those actually before the Court. Western's
language was never issued by this Court. In fact, the Court did not consider which parties
are "appropriate" defendants under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, but rather who has
standing to be a plaintiff under Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-1-4 and 73-3-14-completely
different standards from completely different titles of the Utah Code.
4.

The Question of Who has Standing to Initiate an Appeal has no
Bearing on What Evidence the Court Should Consider Once an
Appeal has been Properly Initiated.

Standing is not an issue in this case because no one questions whether Western
was "aggrieved" by the State Engineer's decision. Similarly, there can be no serious
question about whether Appellees are "appropriate" parties to this action: each
participated in the State Engineer's administrative proceeding; each would be adversely
affected if Western's applications were granted; each was named by Western itself as a
respondent in the de novo proceeding;10 each appeared and answered Western's

10

Appellees include certain parties that were allowed by the State Engineer to
participate in person at the informal administrative proceedings held before the State
Engineer even though their written protests were not timely filed. Western challenges
the district court's April 7, 2006 Minute Entry and Order which would have allowed
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Complaint. The requirements of both Utah Code § 73-3-14 of the substantive water law
("aggrieved" person) and Utah Code §§ 63-46b-14 and -15 of UAPA ("appropriate"
parties respondent) have been met.
The real question that Western's summary judgment motion raised was not who
has "standing" to bring the action or whether Appellees were "appropriate" respondents
in this case, but rather what evidence certain respondents should be allowed to present to
the district court. Indeed, Western did not seek the outright dismissal of any defendants,
but only to prevent them from presenting evidence on selected statutory elements. As the
district court correctly observed in denying Western's motion,
[Western is] not even seeking to dismiss all [Defendants] as
appropriate parties at this time, only seeking to limit participation . .
., essentially using this argument to limit testimony and that is more
properly the role of the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of
Procedure. So my inclination is very strongly to deny the motion
and to allow all those who are currently before the Court, who came
here by the road of being protestants but are now defendants to take
part fully on all elements of 73-3-8 to the extent the evidence is
relevant, admissible and not cumulative.
(Transcript of Motion Hearing, April 10, 2006, at 44, R. 3372.)
The admissibility of evidence is governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence
(pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(3)(b) of the UAPA). The real question is not
participation of these parties at trial. Though the question is likely moot because a
trial was not necessary to resolve this action, the district court's decision was correct.
Allowing participation by such parties in the informal hearing was discretionary with
the State Engineer and, having been allowed to so participate, they were clearly
"appropriate parties" to the appeal of the State Engineer's decision. Indeed, Western
recognized them as such by naming them with the other respondents as parties to this
action, consistent with the definitions and requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-46b-2 and -14, and Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-3, and serving them with legal
process.
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which party happens to present the evidence, but whether the evidence is relevant and
admissible. As shown below, all parties are entitled to present evidence.
First, Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-11(A) (which governs proceedings before the
State Engineer) provides: "All hearings shall be open to all parties and all parties shall
be entitled to introduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, make
arguments, and fully participate in the proceeding." (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the
Rules of Evidence or the Administrative Code imposes issue-by-issue "standing"
requirements on the testimony or evidence that a respondent may offer.

Quite the

contrary, both the policies of the Administrative Code and the formal requirements of the
Rules of Evidence facilitate a full, fair, and efficient adjudication of the merits of the case
before the district court.
Second, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 requires the State Engineer (and, therefore, the
district court on a de novo review) to hear all "interested" persons when considering an
application to appropriate water. Certainly the Appellees are "interested" persons. They
include all of the major public water agencies that operate the public water systems and
provide public water supplies in the very areas Western proposes to serve with the water
it seeks. They include the municipalities whose residents Western proposes to serve.
Those named also include various agencies of the State of Utah (other than the State
Engineer) responsible for wildlife and water resources, state parks, and public recreation.
Yet Western urges the Court to hold that these entities should not be allowed to present
evidence or argument on the impact of Western's proposed projects on the public interest.
The district court correctly rejected this argument.
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There is no legal basis for preventing any Appellee from presenting relevant,
admissible evidence that disproves Western's claims, or that demonstrates why the State
Engineer acted properly in rejecting Western's applications.ll
C.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Award Costs To The Parties
That Prevailed Through A Dismissal On Jurisdictional Grounds.

Appellees prevailed below on jurisdictional grounds and are therefore entitled to
costs under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). Rule 54(d)(1) states that "[e]xcept when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Western
does not argue that an order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not
confer prevailing party status under the rule. Rather, Western argues that because the
district court dismissed Western's administrative appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the district court likewise lacked jurisdiction to award costs pursuant to Rule
54(d). Western relies primarily on Wall v. Dodge, 2 P. 206, 207 (Utah Territory 1883),

The two cases Western cites to support its argument that Appellees were not entitled
to present evidence on all material issues, do not hold that a defendant should be
excluded from fully participating in a case such as this one. See Western's Brief at
41. In Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 2005 Utah App. 488, 2005 Utah
App. LEXIS 473, the court simply held that a quasi-judicial administrative board
should not be named as respondent in an appeal of its own decision" in the absence of
"'a positive legislative grant of authority to the board to defend its decisions.'" Id. ff
25-27 (citation omitted). In Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d
1206, the court simply held that a party cannot claim an injury as a result of another's
change in the diversion point of water if the party has no legal interest in the water
intercepted. See id. ^[38.
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and State ex rel B.B. v. Scott, 2004 UT 39, \ 19, 94 P.3d 252, to support its argument.
But neither of these cases supports Western's position.
In Wall, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah stated that "the judgment of
the court being upon the ground of a want of jurisdiction in the lower court, that court
could not properly render judgment for costs, there being no statute authorizing it" 2 P.
at 207 (emphasis added).

The court's concern in Wall—that there was no statute

authorizing an award of costs—is alleviated by Rule 54(d), which provides for payment
of the prevailing party's costs as a matter of course. In the procedural realm, Rule 54(d)
carries the same weight as a statute because Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution gives the Court "primary constitutional authority to promulgate procedural
and evidentiary rules." Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, f 11, 133 P.3d 370.
Western argues, however, that State ex rel B.B. extends the holding of Wall such
that, regardless of whether there is a statute or rule, if a court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the underlying dispute, it also lacks jurisdiction to award costs.
But Western's reading of State ex rel B.B. ignores the truth that "'[c]ourts that lack
jurisdiction with respect to one kind of decision may have it with respect to another.'"
United States v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1056 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Citizens for
a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2000)). It is true that this Court
stated in State ex rel B.B. that "[g]iven that the juvenile court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the order to show cause, the court also lacked jurisdiction to award
attorney fees." 2004 UT 39, f 19. But the Court prefaced this statement by noting that
"[b]ecause the juvenile courts are creatures of statute, they are courts of limited
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jurisdiction." Id. Thus, the juvenile court's inability to award attorney fees resulted not
solely from its lack of jurisdiction on the underlying dispute, but also from its nature as a
court of limited jurisdiction. In essence, with the underlying contempt claim dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, the juvenile court had no source of jurisdiction to enable its
consideration of the ancillary question of fees.
No similar limitation exists in this case. Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution, district courts "have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
[the] constitution or by statute." There are no statutes or constitutional provisions that
limited the district court's jurisdiction to award costs in this case. Thus, even where it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the underlying claim, the district court could rely on its
original jurisdiction to award costs.
In sum, under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), a district court always has jurisdiction to
award costs to the prevailing party. Appellees therefore request that the Court affirm the
district court's order awarding costs.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Judge Hilder correctly determined that Western had not exhausted its
administrative remedies with regard to the Revised Plan. That plan had not been the
subject of any formal application to appropriate water, was not advertised, and no hearing
was held to consider it. It was first sent in summary form to the State Engineer in
connection with Western's request for reconsideration of the State Engineer's rejection of
Western's applications and was reviewed by the State Engineer only to see if it gave him
reason to reconsider his rejection of those applications.
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Western did not pursue an appeal of the original Conservation Plan but focused
instead on the Revised Plan. Since Western had failed properly to put that plan before
the State Engineer and exhaust its remedies before that agency, Judge Hilder properly
found that he lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Western's judicial review
action and dismissed it.
Judge Hilder also properly found that all parties could rightfully submit evidence
on this de novo review. Finally, Judge Hilder found the Appellees to be the prevailing
parties herein and, as allowed by rule, properly awarded their costs. Each of these rulings
should be affirmed.
DATED this 22A&W

of

November, 2006.

[Signatures on Following Page]

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

Steven E. Clyde (0686)
Edwin Barnes (0217)
Wendy B. Crowther (8842)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS &
SWENSON, P.C.
201 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Conservancy District
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
Attorneys for Central Utah Water
Conservancy District

^J^CAJ^I(
David B. Hartvigsen (5390)
Matthew E. Jensen (10693)
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
215 South State Street, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 413-1600
Attorneys for Magna Water Company, an
Improvement District, and American
Fork City

John H. MabeyTJr. (462*
David C. Wright (5566V
MABEY & WRIGHT; LLC
265 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3663
Attorneys for Kennecott Utah Copper
Corporation, Lehi City, Alpine City, Cedar
Fort Irrigation Company, East Jordan
Irrigation Company, Town of Cedar Fort,
Lehi Irrigation Company, Lehi Spring
Creek Irrigation Company and PacifiCorp

Robert P. Hill (1492)
Allan T. Brinkerhoff (0439)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, #1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Attorneys for Jordan Valley Water

Shawn E. Draney (4026)
Scott H. Martin (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake & Sandy, Utah
Lake Distributing Company, Cahoon &
Maxfield Irrigation Company, Utah
Lake Distributing Company, Provo
River Water Users Association, Salt
Lake City, and Sandy City

JodyL. Williams (3491)
Steven J. Vuyovich (9192)
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
299 South Main Street, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
Attorneys for Irvine Ranch and
Petroleum (dba Ambassador Duck
Club), Burnham Duck Club, and Lower
Jordan River Water Users Association

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
43may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

zA

day of November, 2006,1 caused two true and
I hereby certify that on the
correct copies of Brief of Appellee to be served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage
prepaid, upon the following:
Terry L. Hutchinson

tlh @ infowest.com

TERRY L. HUTCHINSON, PC

368 E. Riverside Drive., Ste C
St. George, Utah 84790
Attorneys for Western Water LLC
John H. Mabey, Jr.
David C. Wright

jmabey@utahwater.com
dwright @ utahwater.com

MABEY & WRIGHT

265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Kennecott Utah Copper,
Lehi City and Alpine City, Lehi Irrigation
Co., Town of Cedar Fort, Cedar Fort
Irrigation Co., Lehi Spring Creek
Irrigation Co., and PacifiCorp
Steven E. Clyde
Edwin Barnes
Wendy B. Crowther

sec@clydesnow.com
ecb@clydesnow.com
wbc @ clydesnow.com

CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON ,P.C.

One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for CUWCD
Jody L. Williams
Steven J. Vuyovich

jody. williams @ hro.com
steven.vuyovich@hro.com

HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Irvine Ranch and
Petroleum (dba Ambassador Duck Club),
Burnham Duck Club, Lower Jordan Water
Users Association and E. Fred Walters
Joro Walker
Sean Phelan

jwalker@westernresources.org
sphelan @ westernresources .org

WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES

425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Attorneys for Sierra Club, Utah Council
of Trout Unlimited, National Audubon Society,
Utah Wetland Foundation, and Utah Waters
David R. Bird
Dallin W. Jensen
Michael M. Quealy

dbird@parsonsbehle.com
djensen@parsonsbehle.com
mquealy@parsonsbehle.com

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company
Norman K. Johnson
Julie Valdes

normanjohnson@utah.gov
jvaldes@utah.gov

UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Attorneys for Utah State Engineer
Allan T. Brinkerhoff
Robert P. Hill

abrinkerhoff@rqn.com
rhill@rqn.com

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Jordan Valley Water
Conservancy District
David B. Hartvigsen
Matthew E. Jensen

david@smithlawonline.com

PLLC
215 South State, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Magna Water Company, an
Improvement District and American Fork City
SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

Randy S. Hunter
randyhunter@utah.gov
th
160 East 300 South, 5 Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Utah Department of Transportation

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

John P. Ashton
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0450
Attorneys for New State, Inc.

jashton@vancott.com

John H. Geilmann
South Jordan City
1600 West Towne Center Drive
South Jordan, UT 84095
Attorneys for South Jordan City

jgeilmann@sjc.utah.gov

Kevin R. Bennett
American Fork City
P. O. Box 146
American Fork, UT 84003
Attorney for American Fork City

kevin@afcity.net

Roger F. Cutler
Ryan B. Carter
West Jordan City
8000 So. Redwood Road, 1st Floor
West Jordan, UT 84088
Attorneys for West Jordan City
Martin B. Bushman

rogerc@wjordan.com
ryanc@wjordan.com

martinbushman@utah.gov

UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

1594 West North Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Attorneys for Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
Heather B. Shilton

heathershilton@utah.gov

UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

1594 West North Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Attorneys for Utah Division of Parks & Recreation
Stephen G. Schwendiman

sschwend@utah.gov

UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

P.O. Box 140814
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Attorneys for Utah Division of Forestry Fire
& State Lands

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Robert Fillerup
1107 South Orem Blvd.
Orem, Utah 84058

rcf@code-co.com

M. Dayle Jeffs

mdjefffs@jeffslawoffice.com

JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for dinger Family Partnership
David L. Church

bclaw@xmission.com

BLAISDELL & CHURCH

5995 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Richard G. Allen
P.O. Box 254
Lehi, Utah 84043
Attorneys for Saratoga Springs
Reid E. Lewis
Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District
8215 S. 1300 W.
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Attorney for JVWCD

rallen@laywer.com

reidl@jvwcd.org

Glenn R. Maughan
P.O. Box 3345 Gorder Sta.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Mack and Marie Wagstaff
7984 North 7800 West
Lehi, Utah 84043
Timothy L. Taylor
1307 North Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Saratoga Springs, Utah 84043
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

'

&?5?
Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Martin

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

